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AS-APPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES, CLASS ACTIONS, AND OTHER
STRATEGIES: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO
CHALLENGING VOTER IDENTIFICATION
LAWS AFTER CRA WFORD V. MARION
COUNTY ELECTION BOARD
Julien Kern *
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a controversial U.S.
Supreme Court decision, recently affirmed the constitutionality of an
Indiana statute requiring federal or state-issued photo identification for
in-person voting. The Court upheld the Indiana voter identification law
as facially valid, but the plurality opinion's evidentiary review left open
the possibility of an as-applied challenge by a future plaintiff The first
part of this Article examines the feasibility of an as-applied challenge
and identifies potential obstacles to bringing such a challenge in the
voter identification context. The second part of this Article analyzes the
possibility of using a class action as-applied challenge as a procedural
solution to overcoming some of these practical obstacles. The third part
of this Article explores alternatives to challenging voter identification
laws, such as seeking relief under the state constitution, pursuing
political and federal solutions, and expanding grassroots efforts to
promote compliance with voter identification laws. Finally, this Article
concludes that the obstacles in bringing an as-applied challenge to
vindicate the rights of voters burdened by voter identification laws are
so substantial that the Supreme Court's allusion to an as-applied
challenge in Crawford proves to be an empty promise, placating
objectors, but in truth, helping no one.
J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Columbia College,
Columbia University. Thank you to the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Nicole Ochi,
Professors Aaron Caplan, Georgene Vairo, and Richard L. Hasen, and all the pro bono
practitioners without whom this Article would not be possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the close of the 2006 Indiana general election, Democrat
Daniel Brock and incumbent Republican Myron Brankle were locked
in a dead heat for the District 2 position on the Grant County
Council.' The initial count indicated that Brankle had prevailed by
one vote. 2 However, after a recount, the votes were tied. ' The Grant
County Council, composed exclusively of Republicans, voted five to
zero in favor of Brankle to break the tie.4  Brock appealed the
recount, arguing that a single provisional ballot should have been
counted in his favor.5 A homeless voter who did not have the
requisite form of government-issued voter identification on Election
Day cast the critical vote.6 The deciding vote was ultimately
counted, and Daniel Brock took his seat on the Grant County
Council.7
Indiana's Voter Identification Law ("Voter ID Law") could have
easily changed the result of this election. Under this law, voters must
present federal or state-issued photo identification at their polling
place on election day.8 If the voter does not possess the requisite
identification-like the critical voter in the Grant County Council
election-he or she may cast a provisional ballot.9 The provisional
ballot will not be counted unless the voter travels at his or her own
expense to the county clerk's office within ten days to either present
the proper identification or sign an affidavit swearing he or she is
indigent or a religious objector. '0 However, the provisional ballot
process can be prohibitively difficult for elderly, disabled, and
indigent people because there is only one county clerk's office per
county, which can be up to several hundred square miles in size. " In
1. Posting of Marcia Oddi, to Indiana Law Blog (April 14, 2007, 14:06 EDT),
http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2007/04/ind-law-electioI.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1 (2006).
9. IND. CODE §§ 3-11.7-5-1, 3-11.7-5-2.5 (2006).
10. Id.
11. IND. CODE § 3-11.7-5-2.5 (2006); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct.
1610, 1629 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the Grant County Council case, the necessary affidavits had been
accidentally sent to the precinct, and the indigent voter signed one on
the spot. 12 But for this act of providence, the critical vote may never
have been counted. 13
Indiana has the most stringent voter identification requirements
in the nation. "4 It is one of only six states that require voters to show
photo identification, and it is the only one of these six that does not
provide an alternative to voters who do not have photo identification
at the voting precinct. 15 Other states that require photo identification
allow noncompliant voters to sign an affidavit confirming their
identity under penalty of perjury, or allow poll workers to confirm
the voter's identity, neither of which requires a second trip to a more
distant location, as Indiana's Voter ID Law does. 16
Indiana's rigorous Voter ID Law threatens to disenfranchise a
significant percentage of voting-age citizenry. Nationally, up to 10
percent of voting-age citizens lack government-issued
identification. With respect to the underlying documentation
necessary to procure voter identification, as many as 7 percent of
U.S. citizens-thirteen million individuals-do not have ready
access to citizenship documents. ,8 In 2006, a survey found that at
least 12 percent of U.S. citizens earning less than $25,000 per year
did not have a readily available U.S. passport, naturalization
document, or birth certificate. "9 Yet another academic study
conducted in 2007 found that approximately 16 percent of voting-age
12. Oddi, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Over half the states do not require in-person identification. See Requirements for Voter
Identification, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/voteridreq.htm (last visited
Mar. 13, 2009). Those twenty-six states simply compel voters to recite their name and current
residence when voting in person in accordance with the voter rolls. Id. Of the remaining states,
fourteen ask for some form of identification without a photo, such as a utility bill, bank statement,
or credit card. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Cassandra 0. Putts & Peter Swire, The ID Divide, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, May 6,
2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05id-divide.html.
18. JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF
AMERICANS' POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO
IDENTIFICATION 2 (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/citizens-
without-proof a.surveyofamericanspossession of documentary-proo/
[hereinafter BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE].
19. Id.
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Indiana citizens did not possess current government-issued photo
identification.20
Obtaining an identification card may seem like a mundane task,
but complying with the Voter ID Law can be frustrating to the point
of impracticability. Although there is no charge for Indiana state-
issued photo identification, the voter must present a number of
underlying documents, such as a birth certificate or passport, which
may cost anywhere from $3 to $100.21 These modest fees may be
prohibitive for an indigent voter. 22 More troubling is the fact that
obtaining underlying documentation typically requires some form of
photo identification, ultimately creating an administrative catch-22.23
Moreover, some voters have religious objections to having their
photos taken, and will not be able to vote unless they comply with
the burdensome provisional ballot procedures. 24
While Indiana's Voter ID Law particularly burdens certain
minority groups, such as indigent, disabled, elderly, and religious-
objector voters,25 it also threatens mainstream voters. For example,
out-of-state students who only possess out-of-state driver's licenses
(as opposed to passports) 26 and married individuals 27 who have
changed their name may not be able to meet the identification
requirements set forth by the Indiana law without a substantial
investment of time, effort, and money. A national survey by the
Brennan Center found that only 48 percent of voting-age women
20. JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAST FACTS ON THE IMPACT OF PHOTO:
ID: THE DATA 2 (2008) http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/%201D-related%
20stats.pdf.
21. See U.S. Department of State, How to Apply in Person for a Passport,
http://travel.state.gov/passport/get/first/first_830.html; Department of State, Passport Fees (Feb.
1, 2008), http://travel.state.gov/passport/get/fees/fees-837.html (individuals sixteen and older can
expect to pay $100 for a passport book and $45 for a passport card). Indiana, like most states,
charges a fee for obtaining a copy of one's birth certificate. This fee varies by county and is
currently between $3 and $12. See Indiana State Department of Health, Local Health Department
Vital Record Fees, http://www.in.gov/isdh/20422.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
22. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2008).
23. Id. at 1629 (Souter, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1621 (plurality opinion).
25. Id.
26. Paul Axel, Some Students, Low-Income Residents May Be Stripped of Their Rights,
BADGER HERALD, May 1, 2008, available at http://badgerherald.com/oped/2008/05/0 I/some_
studentslowinc.php/.
27. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18; ROBERT GREENSTEIN ET AL., CTR. FOR
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SURVEY INDICATES HOUSE BILL COULD DENY VOTING RIGHTS
TO MILLIONS OF U.S. CITIZENS (Sept. 22, 2006), http://wvw.cbpp.org/9-22-06id.pdf.
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with ready access to their U.S. birth certificate have a birth certificate
with their current legal name. 28 The following story is illustrative.
"Mary" is an attorney for the Indianapolis Public Transportation
Corporation who never learned to drive.29 She had a friend drive her
to a local Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") office, where she
presented her passport, her bar certification card, pay stubs from her
government employer, a social security card, a birth certificate, and a
W-2 form from a second government employer. 3 However, she was
denied an identification card and was told that she could not vote
with any of the forms of identification presented, even though she
had been an active, registered voter for over thirty years, simply
because her married name differed from the name on her social
security card and birth certificate. 3 As a result, she spent over $200
to renew her passport in time for election day. 32 If an attorney
equipped with higher education, financial capabilities, and an
intimate knowledge of government bureaucracy found compliance
with Indiana's Voter ID Law to be this expensive and perplexing, the
average citizen might also find the process to be frustratingly
complex or even prohibitively difficult.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board allows for other state legislatures to follow
Indiana's lead and enact increasingly stringent voter identification
legislation. "3 In Crawford, a majority of the Supreme Court upheld
Indiana's Voter ID Law as facially valid. 3 4 The Court reasoned that
the state's interests in election modernization, preventing voter fraud,
and safeguarding voter confidence justified the burden imposed on
voters. " Justice Stevens found the plaintiffs' lack of evidence and
failure to identify any actual voter who was severely burdened to be
28. S. Spec. Subcomm. on Aging, I 10th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Wendy R. Weiser,
Deputy Dir., Democracy Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice), available at http://www.brennan
center.org/content/resource/wendyrweiserbeforesenate-special-Subcommitteeon-aging/
29. Telephone Interview with Ms. Janice Kreucher, Gen. Counsel of the Ind. Pub. Transp.
Corp., (Nov. 21, 2007).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Ironically, she could have voted with an expired passport but did not know of that
exception to the law. Id.
33. David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the
Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483,486 (2008).
34. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
35. See id. at 1623-24.
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dispositive.3 6 Although Justice Stevens agreed that Indiana's Voter
ID Law was facially valid, he recommended that voters who faced a
severe burden could find a remedy through an as-applied challenge. 3
This Article argues that Justice Stevens's suggestion of an as-
applied challenge to vindicate the rights of individuals
disenfranchised by voter identification laws may prove to be an
empty promise placating objectors but in truth helping no one.3 s
Although an as-applied challenge is a feasible strategy in theory, the
voter identification context poses special difficulties that will
discourage viable plaintiffs from using this approach. For example,
plaintiffs who lack the resources to obtain acceptable voter
identification probably also lack the resources to pursue individual
litigation. Moreover, the pro bono attorneys who would
traditionally assist such plaintiffs in bringing suit may lack
motivation to do so because of the slim possibility of recovering
attorney's fees and the limited impact afforded by an individual
remedy. " Even if willing to pursue litigation, pro bono attorneys
have the difficult task of identifying appropriate individual plaintiffs
whose claims will not be mooted by the acquisition of
identification. Finally, the multiplicity of suits generated by
individual as-applied challenges risks creating inconsistent results,
which undermines basic notions of fairness, efficiency, and
equality. 42
The use of a class action may be an appropriate procedural
vehicle by which some of these problems may be addressed. But
certification of a plaintiff class also presents inherent difficulties,
36. See id. at 1622-23.
37. See id. at 1623.
38. Although I limit my inquiry to in-person voter identification laws as demonstrated
through Crawford, my observations may be applicable to voter identification laws in other states.
Many of the issues examined here may also find future relevance in the voter registration context
with respect to proof of citizenship requirements and immigration.
39. Edward A. Morse, Taxing Plaintiffs: A Look at Tax Accounting for Attorney's Fees and
Litigation Costs, 107 DICK. L. REv. 405, 476 (2003).
40. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 601 (2001); Interview with Aaron H. Caplan, Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law
Sch. L.A., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 11, 2008). Professor Caplan served as a staff attorney for the
ACLU of Washington from 1998 to 2008.
41. Id.; see Brian J. Sutherland, Voting Rights Rollback: The Effect of Buckhannon on the
Private Enforcement of Voting Rights, 30 N.C. CENT. L.J. 267, 277 (2008).
42. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:6 (4th ed. 2003).
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which may render an as-applied class action similarly unworkable.
At the very least, the unpredictability of certification itself may
discourage future plaintiffs and their attorneys from pursuing this
legal alternative. Therefore, regardless of whether the challenge is
brought by an individual or by a class, it is unlikely that Justice
Stevens's suggestion of an as-applied challenge will yield tangible
relief for individuals constitutionally burdened by voter identification
laws.
Part II of this Article describes the Supreme Court's holding in
Crawford and Justice Stevens's suggestion of an as-applied
challenge. Part III explores the feasibility of bringing an individual
as-applied challenge and discusses practical obstacles to doing so.
Part IV identifies potential benefits of utilizing a class action
litigation strategy to overcome the practical obstacles identified in
Part III. Part V considers the certification of a hypothetical plaintiff
class and illustrates the problems confronted when choosing this
procedural alternative. Part VI briefly explores other potential
solutions. Finally, Part VII concludes that considering the totality of
the circumstances, the as-applied suggestion simply will not bring
the promised relief to voters who are adversely affected by the Voter
ID Law.
II. CRA WFORD: BURDENS ON VOTERS, THE IMPORTANCE
OF STATE INTERESTS, THE ANDERSON/BURDICK BALANCING
TEST, AND THE SUGGESTION OF AN As-APPLIED CHALLENGE
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a majority of the
Supreme Court upheld Indiana's Voter ID Law.43 The two plurality
opinions were written by Justice Stevens, who was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy," and by Justice Scalia, who
was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito." Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.46 The six Justices in the majority
agreed that Indiana's Voter ID Law was facially valid under the
Anderson/Burdick balancing test because legitimate state interests
43. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615, 1627 (2008).
44. Id. at 1613.
45. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
joined Justice Souter's dissent, and Justice Breyer wrote separately.
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justified the burden imposed by the law on voters." However, the
two plurality opinions employed different methods of applying the
test and disagreed about the viability of future as-applied
challenges." This section will analyze Crawford by describing the
burdens created by Indiana's Voter ID Law, the state's interests in
requiring identification, and the two divergent approaches to
balancing these interests under the Anderson/Burdick test.
A. The Burdens of Indiana's Voter ID Law
As discussed above, there are numerous potential burdens
associated with the compliance with Indiana's Voter ID Law, and the
task of obtaining state or federal government-issued identification is
deceptively difficult. Although Indiana's Bureau of Motor
Vehicles ("BMV") provides photo identification for free, applicants
must present a primary document, such as an original birth
certificate; 5 a secondary document, such as a bank statement; and
possibly additional proof of Indiana residency. 51
In Indiana, the cost of a birth certificate is $10, and the fees for
residents born elsewhere may be as high as $28, with no provision to
avoid this expense. 52 Citizens born out of state, like many college
students, must go to the additional trouble of navigating a distant,
recalcitrant bureaucracy to obtain proper underlying
documentation. " Also, states did not uniformly issue birth
certificates until the late 1940s, which means that elderly people-
through no fault of their own-may never have possessed a birth
certificate at all. 54 Additionally, people who were adopted or who
47. Id. at 1616; id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See generally Christopher S.
Elmendorf& Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping v. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections:
Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 507, 523-24
(2008).
48. Id.
49. IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2006). Voter ID law does not apply
to voters desiring to vote by absentee ballot or to those voters living in a state-licensed nursing
home.
50. Applicants may instead present a certificate of naturalization if they were born outside
the United States.
51. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 790-91 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
52. Id. at 791, 798.
53. Axel, supra note 26.
54. U.S. Census Bureau, Birth Records and Age Search Service, http://www.census.gov/po/
www/foia/birth.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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had transient childhoods may not know where they were born.
Again, obtaining the underlying identification to acquire the
government-issued voter identification often requires applicants to
show some form of identification, which traps such unfortunate
voters by a circuitous logic that is akin to a catch-22. "
If the voter is able to surmount the hurdle of obtaining the
underlying documentation, he or she may not be physically able to
travel to a local BMV. 56 Although the "average person" probably
views such a burden as nothing more than an inconvenience, "[p]oor,
old, and disabled voters who do not drive a car... may find the trip
prohibitive .. . ." " Offices of the BMV may be few and far between,
whereas vast numbers of polling places are usually within walking
distance of residences within the voting precinct. " For example,
Marion County, Indiana, has over nine hundred active voting
precincts but only twelve BMV offices distributed throughout the
entire county. " In smaller counties, there may be only one BMV
office. 60 Therefore, in terms of distance, the process to obtain a
government-issued identification can be much more burdensome
than is readily apparant.
As mentioned earlier, the Voter ID Law does provide a limited
recourse or work-around for individuals who do not possess (or did
not bring) proper photo identification on election day. 61 A voter
without identification may cast a provisional ballot, but the ballot
will not be counted unless the voter goes to the county clerk's office
within ten days either to prove that he or she possesses qualifying
state or federal identification or to sign an affidavit swearing that he
or she is indigent or a religious objector. 62
Although this work-around creates a theoretical alternative for
many of the groups burdened by voter identification requirements, it
provides very little relief as a practical matter. Voters who do not
55. See id.
56. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1629 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1629-30.
61. IND. CODE §§ 3-11.7-1, 3-11.7-5-2.5 (2006).
62. IND. CODE §§ 3-11.7-5-2.5, 3-11-8-23, 3-11-8-25.1 (2006).
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have photo identification are not likely to own cars.63 Without a car,
it may be complicated and costly to travel to the county clerk's
office, which in large counties could feasibly be located hundreds of
miles away. ' Moreover, as of August 2007, only twenty-one out of
the ninety-two counties in Indiana have any form of public
transportation.65  Among the counties that possess public
transportation infrastructure, only eighteen have transportation
countywide.66  The hidden costs of time and energy in procuring
underlying documents, arranging multiple trips to government
offices, and navigating intractable bureaucracy impose additional
burdens upon voters that are not immediately obvious when
examining Indiana's Voter ID Law.
B. Justice Stevens 's Articulation of Indiana's
Interests in Voter Identification Requirements
In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens pointed to three state
interests in requiring photo identification that arguably justified the
burdens that this law imposed on voters: (1) modernizing elections,
(2) the preventing voter fraud, and (3) safeguarding voter
confidence. 67
First, Justice Stevens found that Indiana's Voter ID Law was a
legitimate effort to modernize elections and establish electoral
integrity through improved technology. 68 In doing so, he relied on
two federal statutes: the National Voter Registration Act of 1993
("NVRA"), which requires state motor vehicle driver's license
applications to serve as voter registration applications, 69 and the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA"),7 ° which imposes voter
identification requirements on first-time voters who register to vote
by mail. 71 Although neither of these statutes translated directly into
63. Brief for Current and Former State Secretaries of State as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (No. 07-21,
07-25), 2007 WL 4133217.
64. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1628-30.
65. Id. at 1630.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1617-20.
68. Id. at 1617-18.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2000)
70. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (Supp. 112002).
71. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617.
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Indiana's Voter ID Law, the Court read them broadly as indications
that Congress supported the use of photo identification to modernize
elections and improve electoral integrity. 72 Justice Stevens stated,
"Of course, neither HAVA nor NVRA required Indiana to enact [the
Voter ID Law], but they do indicate that Congress believes that
requiring photo identification is one effective method of establishing
a voter's qualification to vote and that the integrity of elections is
enhanced through improved technology." 73
Second, Justice Stevens considered the state interest in
preventing voter fraud. 74 Curiously, there are no recorded instances
of in-person voter fraud in Indiana's history.75  Although one
incident of voter fraud occurred during the 2003 Democratic primary
in Indiana, it was limited to absentee voting, not in-person voting. 76
Nevertheless, the Court found this interest compelling by citing
incidents of voter fraud throughout history in other states, including
the famously corrupt New York City Tammany Hall Election.77
Critics of voter identification laws point out that severe criminal
penalties for in-person voter fraud already provide adequate
protection against this problem. 78 Also, the few instances of voter
fraud that have been reported in recent years primarily occurred
through absentee voting, to which the Voter ID Law does not
apply. " However, the Court maintained that the state interest in
stopping voter fraud was wholly legitimate, even though adequate
methods of preventing such fraud may already exist. 8o
72. Id. at 1617-18.
73. Id. at 1618.
74. Id. at 1616-18.
75. David Shultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the
Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 504-05 (2008).
76. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619.
77. Id. at 1619, n.11.
78. Id. at 1619.
79. Id. at 1613.
80. Id. at 1619. Many scholars have written detailed discussions on voter fraud and the
legitimacy of the state interest. See Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why),
41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93 (2007); David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter
Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483
(2008); Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed., Courts Need to Keep a Skeptical Eye on New Voter
Identification Laws, ELECTIONLAW@MORITZ, Apr. 24, 2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=147.
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Finally, Justice Stevens found that Indiana's interest in
protecting voter confidence in the electoral process was a sufficiently
weighty interest to justify its voter identification requirements. 8'
Although this interest is closely related to the state interest in
preventing voter fraud, it has independent significance because it
"encourages citizen participation in the democratic process."" The
Court relied on a report by former President Jimmy Carter and
former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, which was issued
shortly after the enactment of Indiana's Voter ID Law and stated that
"[t]he electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no
safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of
voters."83
However, some scholars note that an overzealous pursuit of
these state interests may result in the exclusion of qualified voters
from the polls and the dilution of votes for a certain candidate or
party, actually undermining the state interest in voter confidence. 84
For example, the occurrence of the type of fraud that photo
identification requirements aim to deter-such as in-person voter
impersonation fraud-is extraordinarily small, but the number of
eligible citizens who would be denied their right to vote as a result of
photo identification requirements is exceedingly large. 85 One study
noted that in-person voter impersonation fraud is "an occurrence
more rare than getting struck by lightning."86 Furthermore, experts
concede that absentee voting, as opposed to in-person fraud, is the
one area of election administration that is most vulnerable to
fraudulent activity. 87 Even so, Justice Stevens ultimately accepted
the state interests in election modernization, preventing voter fraud,
81. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620.
82. Id.
83. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U. S.
ELECTIONS § 2.5 (Sept. 2005).
84. See Steven Ansolabehere, Access Versus Integrity in Voter Identification Requirements
63 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 613 (2008).
85. Spencer Overton, Carter Baker Dissenting Statement, http://www.carterbakerdis
sent.com/dissent.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
86. JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD 6,
(2007), available at http://truthaboutfraud.org/pdf/TruthAboutVoterFraud.pdf.
87. Shultz, supra note 75.
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and promoting public confidence, and legitimized these interests
after weighing them against the burdens imposed on voters. 88
C. The Anderson/Burdick Balancing Test
To evaluate the constitutional validity of Indiana's Voter ID
Law, the Court used the Anderson/Burdick balancing test to weigh
the burdens on potential voters against the proposed state interests. 89
The Anderson/Burdick balancing test has been applied inconsistently,
which has unsettled election administration law in recent years. 9 In
fact, even the two plurality opinions in Crawford applied it
differently. 91
Justice Scalia took a formalist view of the test and interpreted it
to mean that strict scrutiny should only be applied to laws that
"severely" burden political rights and that all other laws should be
treated deferentially. 92 In this case, he determined that the law "is a
generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation" and "[t]he
burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo
identification is simply not severe" in comparison to the usual
burdens associated with voting. 93 In fact, he flatly refused a future
"record-based" challenge to the Voter ID Law 94 and completely
rejected the as-applied challenge suggested by Justice Stevens.95
Instead, Justice Scalia opined that the Court must make an overall
assessment of the law to determine whether the state requirements go
beyond the "merely inconvenient."96  Ordinary, widespread
requirements such as Indiana's Voter ID Law should not be deemed
to be severe. 9'
88. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1617-21 (2008); see also
infra Part II.C. A detailed discussion about the legitimacy of the state interests is beyond the
scope of this Article.
89. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616-17.
90. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in Election
Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007).
91. See Elmendorf & Foley, supra note 47, at 535. "Justice Stevens' [Crawford] opinion
can also be understood as an exercise in pragmatism, though Stevens, Kennedy, and Roberts
evidently saw the risks and rewards of their approach somewhat differently than did Scalia." Id.
92. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624.
93. Id. at 1625, 1627.
94. Id. at 1625.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Elmendorf & Foley, supra note 47, at 523.
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However, six Justices rejected Justice Scalia's formalist, two-
tiered system and took a more flexible approach to the
Anderson/Burdick test. " According to Justice Stevens's analysis,
"[h]owever slight [a] burden may appear.., it must be justified by
relevant and legitimate state interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify
the limitation."' 99 Therefore, the state interests must be proportional
to the burden.
In applying this test to Indiana's Voter ID Law, Justice Stevens
took issue with the evidence available on the record. 100 He noted that
the evidence presented did not establish: (1) the number of registered
voters without photo identification; (2) concrete evidence of the
burden imposed on voters who currently lack photo identification;
and (3) the difficulties faced by indigent voters or voters with
religious objections to being photographed. "' Although Justice
Stevens did not specify the kind of evidence he would require in the
future, he determined that the evidence in Crawford made it
impossible to evaluate the magnitude of the burden on a "narrow
class of voters." 102
The plaintiffs in Crawford did provide evidence, but it was
rejected as insufficient on various grounds. For example, the
plaintiffs offered statistical evidence that 43,000 Indiana residents
did not have government-issued identification, but the Court rejected
the statistic as outdated and "utterly incredible and unreliable." 103 In
addition, the plaintiffs also provided testimony from two
caseworkers at homeless shelters as evidence of how the voter
identification requirements burdened indigent voters. 104 However,
the Court dismissed this testimony as irrelevant because they did not
express a personal inability to vote. 105 Moreover, the plaintiffs
offered the testimony of various elderly citizens who had problems
obtaining voter identification. The Court also rejected this testimony
98. Id.
99. Crawford 128 S. Ct. at 1616.
100. Id. at 1622.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Regarding the statistical evidence, the Court further stated, "Supposition based on
extensive Internet research is not an adequate substitute for admissible evidence subject to cross-
examination in constitutional adjudication." Id. at 1623, n.20.
104. Id. at 1622.
105. Id.
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because the elderly individuals ultimately succeeded in obtaining the
underlying documentation after the start of litigation or did not
adequately explain the personal burdens that prevented them from
doing so. "' The Court acknowledged a homeless woman's affidavit,
which stated that she had obtained her birth certificate but was
denied a photo identification card because she lacked a mailing
address. 07 However, the Court ultimately rejected her affidavit as
insufficient because it "[gave] no indication of how common the
problem is." "'
Ultimately, the Court believed the hassles of gathering the
underlying documents to obtain the qualifying identification and
traveling to the local BMV "impose[d] only a limited burden on
voters' rights." 109 Justice Stevens further concluded that the severity
of whatever burden might be imposed on certain classes by the Voter
ID Law was adequately mitigated through the provisional ballot
exception. "10
D. The Suggestion of an As-Applied Challenge
Justice Stevens's evidentiary review in Crawford left open the
possibility of an as-applied challenge by a future plaintiff who can
prove that Indiana's Voter ID Law imposes severe burdens upon him
or her. "' Although the possibility of a facial challenge has been
foreclosed, the Anderson/Burdick balancing test may come out in
favor of the plaintiff, depending on the evidence presented in an as-
applied challenge. 12 After all, the Court did not give any direction
as to how the balance should be struck in as-applied cases involving
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1622-23.
108. Id. at 1622.
109. Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992)).
110. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621.
111. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10-18,
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL
4351593; Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a
Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643; But see Rick Hasen,
Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010701.html (Apr. 28, 2008 8:17 PST)
(observing that the decision "encourage[s] further litigation, because it relegates challenges to
laws imposing onerous burdens on a small group of voters to 'as applied' challenges, but those
challenges will be difficult to win").
112. Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It's Still the Kennedy Court, 11 GREEN BAG
2d 427, 428 (2008).
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severe burdens. "' In an as-applied challenge, the Justices who adopt
Justice Stevens's flexible approach to the balancing test will have to
resolve a dichotomy: whether the Court should consider the
widespread burdens on the voting electorate or whether it should
consider the magnitude of individual burdens on one or a few
affected voters. 114 How this dichotomy will be resolved remains to
be seen in future litigation.
Since Crawford, Indiana's Voter ID Law has been enforced in
several election cycles, and stories of individual voters experiencing
significant burdens have emerged. For example, twelve elderly nuns
were turned away from the polls because they did not possess the
requisite identification. 115 As the nuns were in their eighties and
nineties, they possessed such limited physical mobility that traveling
to the county clerk's office within ten days would not have been
possible even if they had cast provisional ballots. 116 Among other
reported cases, a seventy-eight-year-old Korean War veteran could
not obtain state voter identification in time for the election after his
wallet was stolen, and he was left with only his Medicare card as his
sole source of identification; 117 a college student at Purdue
University could not obtain a voter identification card in time
because the BMV refused to accept his out-of-state driver's license
even though it was supposed to be an acceptable form of underlying
documentation; ... and a stay-at-home mother of seven and wife of a
janitor could not afford the costs associated with obtaining a voter
identification card. 119 Moreover, uneven application of the Voter ID
Law produced additional problems because some poll workers
113. Elmendorf& Foley, supra note 47, 515.
114. Id. at 534.
115. Deborah Hastings, Indiana Nuns Lacking ID Denied at Poll by Fellow Sister,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 6, 2008, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D90GBCNOO&
showarticle=1/.
116. Id. Although the mere lack of an ID is not enough to demonstrate a burden, the nuns
were not provided with an appropriate provisional ballot because they were unable to travel to the
county clerk's office in time to sign an affidavit due to their advanced age. Id.
117. Posting of Steven Rosenfeld, to AlterNet, http://www.altemet.org/story/68368/ (Nov. 20,
2007).
118. Id. However, several of his friends were able to vote because they possessed passports.
Id.
119. See Rosenfeld, supra note 117.
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demanded more identification than was required by the statute. 120
Although these are merely anecdotal stories illustrating significant
burdens, they demonstrate the very real presence of burdened voters
and point to the distinct possibility that legally significant burdens
may exist for certain classes of citizens. Thus, an as-applied
challenge remains a potential solution.
1II. THE FEASIBILITY OF BRINGING AN As-APPLIED
CHALLENGE TO INDIANA'S VOTER ID LAW
Plaintiffs can challenge the constitutionality of a statute through
either facial or as-applied challenges. 121 Because the Voter ID Law
survived a facial challenge in Crawford, a future voter would have to
challenge the law as applied to a particular set of circumstances. 122
Despite the allure of such as-applied challenges, the scarcity of
resources, the lack of a widespread remedy, and the hardship of
identifying appropriate plaintiffs may effectively prevent future
plaintiffs and their attorneys from bringing suits in the voter
identification context. "3 The practical consequence of such
obstacles is to leave plaintiffs with no real judicial recourse to
challenge the law.
A. Distinguishing a Facial Challenge
from an As-Applied Challenge
An as-applied challenge "is a claim that the operation of a
statute is unconstitutional in a particular case, while a facial
challenge indicates that the statute may rarely or never be
constitutionally applied." 124 A facial challenge, like the one staged
in Crawford, is generally considered more difficult to mount
successfully because the challenger must establish that no
120. Eric Marshall, Indiana Voter ID Law Disenfranchises Voters, from Students to Nuns,
ELECTION PROTECTION, May 7, 2008, http://www.866ourvote.org/newsroom/news?id=0023 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2009).
121. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008); see also Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges
to State and Federal Regulations, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 ("Conventional wisdom holds that a
court may declare a statute unconstitutional in one of two manners: (1) the court may declare it
invalid on its face, or (2) the court may find the statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular
set of circumstances.").
122. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1610.
123. See infra Part II.B.
124. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187.
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circumstances exist under which the legislation would be valid. 25
Conversely, an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute is evaluated according to how the statute operates in practice
against the particular litigant and under the facts of the specific case,
rather than under hypothetical facts in other situations. 126 In recent
years, 127 the Supreme Court Justices have generally disfavored facial
challenges because they are highly reluctant to invalidate legislation
on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the
Court. 121 In contrast, as-applied challenges do not have to rely on
speculation, and each court may simply consider the evidence and
the facts on the record at hand. 129
Consequently, even if a statute is facially upheld, as-applied
challenges are still available to plaintiffs who believe the law is
unconstitutional in its application to them specifically. 130 To
illustrate, in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England, 131 the Supreme Court upheld a state abortion law on its face
but deemed it unconstitutional in certain limited circumstances. 132 In
that case, petitioners alleged that New Hampshire's Parental
Notification Prior to Abortion Act 133 was unconstitutional because it
failed to provide an emergency health exception for minors faced
with significant time-sensitive health risks due to pregnancy. 134
Although the statute was upheld as facially valid, the Court
recognized that the statute could be unconstitutional as applied to
mothers whose health might be seriously jeopardized by delays
inherent in complying with parental notification. 135 The Court
stated, "Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw
in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer,
for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a
125. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
126. Id. at 745, n.3.
127. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 236 (1994).
128. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
129. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187.
130. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006).
131. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
132. Id. at 331.
133. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132:24-28 (Supp. 2004), repealed by 2007 NH H.P. 184 (NS).
134. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 327-28.
135. Id. at 331.
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statute while leaving other applications in force." 136 Because as-
applied challenges are still available where facial challenges fail,
voter identification laws may still be held to be unconstitutional
when applied in certain cases.
B. Practical Obstacles That Cast Doubt on the
Feasibility of an Individual As-Applied Challenge
As-applied challenges are typically made on behalf of an
individual. "' However, in the voter identification context, several
practical obstacles exist that make individual as-applied challenges
infeasible. A plaintiff without the resources to obtain government-
issued photo identification is unlikely to have the time, money, and
knowledge to pursue litigation. 13' Although pro bono attorneys
normally represent indigent plaintiffs, such attorneys may not want
to take on an as-applied challenge because of the financial risks
particular to voter identification cases. In addition to possible
financial limitations, pro bono attorneys may be dissuaded from
pursuing an as-applied challenge because even a successful suit
could result in a remedy limited to that individual alone. '
Moreover, pursuing an individual as-applied challenge to voter
identification requirements is risky because of the possibility that the
plaintiffs claim will become moot. 140 From an economic efficiency
perspective, a pro bono attorney could use his or her resources better
by simply giving the voter the money he or she needs to get
identification. 141 Therefore, individual plaintiffs burdened by
Indiana's voter identification requirements are unlikely to find
representation for their as-applied challenges.
136. Id. at 328-29.
137. See Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness:
Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L.
REv. 381, 385-87 (2002).
138. See Morse, supra note 39, at 476.
139. Interview with Aaron H. Caplan, supra note 40.
140. See Sutherland, supra note 40.
141. Telephone Interview with Joanne Evers, President, League of Women Voters of Ind.
(Jan. 7, 2009).
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1. Lack of Resources for Plaintiffs
to Pursue Individual Litigation
The most immediately obvious obstacle to an individual as-
applied challenge is that the types of voters who are most likely to be
severely burdened by voter identification laws suffer from a lack of
resources that makes personal litigation essentially impossible. 142 If
voters are too financially burdened to pay for travel costs, to buy a
replacement birth certificate, or to navigate the bureaucracy to obtain
the supporting documentation required for voter identification, then
they are unlikely to have the resources necessary to bring their own
litigation. 143 Moreover, most people do not pay attention to their
voting rights until shortly before an election, and at that point, it may
be too late to obtain a lawyer. Therefore, most voters burdened by
identification requirements must rely upon pro bono attorneys to
champion their as-applied challenges.
For pro bono attorneys, significant financial gambles are
inherent in the pursuit of a voter identification case. Courts have
held that the Voting Rights Act itself does not authorize any
monetary damages. "' Also, in 1976, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act ("CRAFAA"), which gave courts
the authority to award reasonable attorney's fees to "prevailing
parties" in suits brought to enforce certain civil rights acts. 145 The
Supreme Court clarified the scope of the CRAFAA in Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources, 146 which dictates that a court must award a
litigant some relief on the merits for the litigant to recover attorney's
fees. "' Voting rights litigation is particularly susceptible to
Buckhannon because plaintiffs in voting rights cases do not seek
monetary damages but instead seek the equitable remedies of
142. Telephone Interview with William R. Groth, Senior Partner, Fillenwarth, Dennerline,
Groth & Towe (Nov. 17, 2008). Groth represented the Indiana Democratic Party in Rokita v.
Indiana Democratic Party, 128 S. Ct. 830 (2008).
143. Id.
144. Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that there exists
no cause of action for damages under the Voting Rights Act).
145. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)).
146. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
147. Id. at 601-02.
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declaratory and injunctive relief. 148 Thus, the only way that
attorney's fees can be recovered under Buckhannon is for the
plaintiff to be awarded some judicial relief in the form of a favorable
judgment, a settlement enforced through a consent decree, or some
other "court-ordered change [in] the legal relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant." "'
Thus, even though the possibility of recovering fees exists in
theory, the financial risks that face pro bono attorneys litigating voter
identification cases is oppressively substantial. Such risks may serve
as effective deterrents for pro bono attorneys who hazard conducting
litigation at a financial loss.
2. Lack of a Widespread Remedy
Pro bono attorneys take on a case for a variety of reasons aside
from financial remuneration, such as the opportunity to produce a
widespread restoration of civil rights. 150 Because such attorneys are
more likely to champion a case that has the potential to create a far-
reaching result, they might be dissuaded from taking on an as-
applied case, where the remedy to a voting rights violation may be an
injunction only for the individual plaintiff in one particular election.
This limitation makes as-applied voter identification cases less
attractive to pro bono attorneys who are primarily motivated by
effecting significant social change. ' Moreover, as-applied
challenges with limited remedies rely heavily on the process of case-
by-case adjudication. Pro bono attorneys inundated by requests for
case-by-case adjudication may find their own legal resources limited
and even depleted by such numerous requests. This dilution of
scarce resources may have a detrimental effect on the overall
enforcement of voting rights if pro bono attorneys find themselves
outnumbered and unable to focus their energies on the most severely
burdened plaintiffs in need of representation. 152
148. Windy Boy v. Big Horn County, 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1023-24 (D. Mont. 1986) (allowing
no damages under the Voting Rights Act because "injunctive relief is the universal remedy... in
Voting Rights Act cases").
149. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989))
150. Interview with Aaron H. Caplan, supra note 40.
151. Id.
152. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1333, 1336 (2005).
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Finally, under the as-applied model, courts implement
constitutional norms on a slower, more gradual basis than they do
through facial challenges. 153 If voter identification laws are
challenged through dozens or even hundreds of suits by individual
voters, constitutional change will occur, but at a glacial pace. 114
3. The Challenge of Identifying
Appropriate Plaintiffs
Another obstacle inherent in as-applied challenges in the voter
identification context is identifying appropriate plaintiffs. Here,
potential categories of plaintiffs that may bring voter identification
suits are the elderly, the indigent, the disabled, students born out of
state with only an out-of-state driver's license, voters who have
changed their name, and religious objectors. Pro bono attorneys
want to focus their energies on only the most burdened plaintiffs, and
the potential categories of plaintiffs make it difficult for pro bono
attorneys to choose whom to represent.
Another risk of as-applied challenges is the potential for the
plaintiff's claim to become moot if he or she obtains voter
identification during the course of extended litigation. "' This
situation actually occurred in an unsuccessful case, Stewart v.
Marion County, 156 brought by a pro se plaintiff against Indiana's
Voter ID Law after Crawford. In Stewart, the plaintiff claimed that
his vote was denied in 2006 and that during the primary held in May
2008, he tried to vote but was denied the opportunity because he
lacked valid photo identification. 157 He argued that his case differed
from Crawford on three grounds: (1) He asserted an as-applied
challenge instead of a facial challenge; (2) he had actually been
denied the right to vote; and (3) his complaint asserted different
claims that were not at issue in Crawford. ' In spite of these
153. Id. at 1335.
154. See id.
155. In general, a claim becomes moot when the challenged conduct ceases, the issues
presented are no longer "live," or parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969).
156. See Stewart v. Marion County, No 1:08-CV-586-LJM-TAB, 008 WL 4690984, slip copy
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2008) (finding that because the plaintiff had obtained the proper form of
voter identification after filing the case, he no longer had standing to bring suit).
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *3.
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differences, the court held that because the plaintiff had obtained the
proper form of voter identification after filing the case, he no longer
had standing to bring the suit. 9 This cautionary tale illustrates that
choosing an appropriate plaintiff whose claim will not be mooted is a
difficult task for a pro bono attorney or legal aid organization. 160
Another potential and related mootness problem is that
preventing a plaintiff from obtaining identification in order to pursue
litigation may also present an ethical problem for pro bono
lawyers. 6' Joanne Evers, president of the League of Women Voters
of Indiana, explained, "The goal is to get voters a voter ID, not to use
them in a lawsuit." 162 To stage a successful as-applied challenge, the
burdened voter would have to be continuously deprived of
identification. In the meantime, the voter may miss the opportunity
to vote in multiple elections. '63 Ms. Evers summarized, "[Keeping a
potential voter from obtaining identification just to bring
litigation]would be defeating the goals of the organization." "
Although it would be premature to conclude that these
difficulties are insurmountable, they illustrate discouraging practical
obstacles to the suggested individual as-applied challenge.
IV. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF UTILIZING CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION TO OVERCOME PRACTICAL OBSTACLES
A class action as-applied challenge may be the most viable and
manageable litigation strategy to vindicate the rights of citizens
severely burdened by voter identification laws. Scarce plaintiff
resources are preserved by class representation, and pro bono
attorneys are able to dedicate themselves to one case, rather than
having their energies dispersed by case-by-case litigation. Without a
tool like a class action, where a pro bono attorney can aggregate
large numbers of individual claims to achieve a widespread remedy
through an injunction, it is less likely that a pro bono attorney will
take on a voter identification case. Moreover, class actions can avoid
mootness problems that could arise in an individual suit.
159. Id.
160. Interview with Joanne Evers, supra note 141.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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A. Class Action Litigation as a Potential Solution
A class action is a procedural device that allows numerous
parties to aggregate similar claims into a single action against a
defendant or defendants who have allegedly caused harm. 65 The
representative nature of class actions, litigated on behalf of all people
who are similarly situated, is particularly appropriate in civil rights
cases that seek declaratory and injunctive relief for a numerous and
amorphous class of persons. 66 In fact, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") 23(b)(2), which allows injunctive or declaratory
relief appropriate for an entire class, was promulgated in 1966 as a
tool for facilitating civil rights actions. 167 Since its enactment, FRCP
23(b)(2) class actions have succeeded in several types of
discrimination and civil rights claims, including racial
discrimination, gender discrimination, and even voting rights
claims. 168 After Crawford, this approach may provide the best-and
perhaps the only-option to enforce the voting rights of citizens
disenfranchised by identification laws.
B. Efficient Use of Resources for
Plaintiffs and Pro Bono Attorneys
Class actions generally promote the efficient use of resources for
plaintiffs and their counsel, but they have particular relevance when
used in a civil rights context. For plaintiffs, a class action may be the
only means to obtain relief when their individual claims are too de
minimis to support individual litigation, or when plaintiffs are too
unaware of their own legal rights to pursue their individual claims. 169
The concept of aggregation is traditionally discussed in class action
cases for damages with small individual recoveries, 170 but by
analogy, aggregation also works to the benefit of pro bono attorneys
seeking broader remedies than individual litigation could provide. 171
165. See Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir. 1998).
166. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:11 (4th ed. 2003); see also Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 389 (1967).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
168. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.43 (3d ed. 2008).
169. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuns, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
170. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
171. Id.
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The class action form is also an efficient use of resources for pro
bono attorneys because it allows them to pursue litigation without
having to identify, locate, and choose among all possible plaintiffs. 172
Because class actions are representative suits on behalf of all people
who are similarly situated, absent plaintiffs are also protected,
assuming that certification requirements pursuant to FRCP 23 have
been met. 173 Thus, the burden on pro bono attorneys to bring an as-
applied challenge is greatly alleviated by having to find only one
class representative, or representatives of each subclass, rather than
trying to represent all burdened plaintiffs. "'
For example, in Warren v. City of Tampa, 175 a lawsuit was filed
under the Voting Rights Act challenging the procedure by which all
members of the City Council and the County Board of
Commissioners were elected. 176 In that case, the plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief and moved to have the class certified on behalf of
approximately 30,000 registered black electors in the county and
approximately 20,000 registered black electors in the city. ' The
class was defined as "all black citizens who are presently registered
voters who are potentially eligible voters of the City of Tampa or of
Hillsborough County." ' The class action resulted in a settlement
whereby the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their lawsuit in exchange for
the defendants' promise to (a) develop and implement several
programs designed to increase black voter participation, and (b)
enact an ordinance to allow City Council members to come from any
district. "9 In this case, thousands of plaintiffs whose voting rights
were affected achieved their desired result while economizing on
resources and representation by using a class action. This result
illustrates the potential utility and power of a class action within the
voting rights context.
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b), advisory committee's notes; see also 1 NEWBERG, supra note 42, §
2:10.
173. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 811-12.
174. Interview with Aaron Caplan, supra note40.
175. 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1052 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1053.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1059.
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C. The Economy of Litigation Through the
Pursuit of a Widespread Remedy
One of the express purposes of class actions is to avoid
multiplicity of suits and prevent inconsistent or varying
adjudications. 180 These goals are not only beneficial to plaintiffs and
their attorneys but also economical for defendants and for the judicial
system at large. '81 The Court in United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty "' summarized:
The justifications that led to the development of the class
action include the protection . . . from inconsistent
obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the
provision of a convenient and economical means for
disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the
spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with
similar claims. 183
The benefits of this procedural vehicle are particularly obvious
in challenging the constitutionality of a statute pertaining to voter
identification laws. 184 In Warren, for example, the remedy created a
solution for all adversely affected voters living in a particular county
and also called for a change in a local ordinance. 185 Such a result
probably would have been far less likely with one black voter
pursuing individual litigation. Thus, the widespread vindication of
civil rights, which pro bono attorneys often seek, may be manifestly
more attainable through a class action.
D. Avoidance of Mootness Problems for Plaintiffs
One of the primary advantages of bringing a class action is to
circumvent case dismissal due to mootness, which is a significant
obstacle in the individual as-applied challenge. 186 For example, in
Dunn v. Blumstein, 87 a class was certified challenging a Tennessee
180. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
181. 2 NEWBERGsupra note 166, § 5:36.
182. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
183. Id. at 402-03.
184. 2 NEWBERG, supra note 166, § 5:58.
185. Warren v. City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1059 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
186. See Richard K. Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class Actions,
35 STAN. L. REv. 897, 901 (1983).
187. 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
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law's three-month residency requirement for voting. 188 Although the
class representative satisfied the state residency requirement during
the course of litigation, the district court held that the problem to
voters posed by the Tennessee residency requirements was "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" as to the rest of the class
members. 189 Although this doctrine is not limited to the class action
context, it would not be applicable in an individual as-applied voter
identification context because once a voter obtains identification for
one election, the same identification may be used in subsequent
elections. It is precisely this situation that mooted the plaintiff's case
in Stewart v. Marion County. 190
By contrast, even if the named representative in a class action
obtains the proper form of voter identification during litigation, the
case may avoid the problem of mootness. In Sosna v. Iowa, ' the
Supreme Court recognized that after class certification, the class
takes on a separate legal identity apart from the class
representative. 192 Thus, the mootness of the class representative's
individual claim and the loss of a personal stake in the outcome will
not render the class action moot. ' This holding was affirmed and
expanded in Geraghty, which involved the right of a class
representative whose individual claim had expired to appeal a ruling
denying class certification. 194 In Geraghty, the Supreme Court held
that the mootness of the plaintiff's individual claim did not preclude
the plaintiff from vigorously and adequately protecting class interests
in appealing the class denial. 195 This exception to the formal
standing doctrine recognizes the special nature of class actions in
contrast to traditional individual litigation. 196 As such, class actions
may prove to be a useful method for overcoming the major obstacle
of mootness in an individual as-applied challenge.
188. Id. at 324, affd 405 U.S. 330, 330 (1972) (assumed class certification by language "in
his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated").
189. Id. at 333 n.2.
190. Stewart v. Marion County, No. l:08-CV-586-LJM-TAE, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21,
2008).
191. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
192. Id. at 399.
193. Id.
194. U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 390 (1980).
195. Id. at 404.
196. See id.
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V. CERTIFYING A PLAINTIFF CLASS IN AN
As-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO A VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAW
The benefits of a class action breathe new hope into the
possibility of a viable challenge to voter identification laws, but it
remains unclear whether a voter identification class could meet
certification. Assuming that a "single, individual Indiana resident
who will be unable to vote as a result of [the Voter ID Law]" '
exists, the putative class must satisfy the four explicit prerequisites of
FRCP 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4)
adequacy of representation. 198 The Seventh Circuit also requires that
the class meet an implicit threshold requirement of definiteness. '
Finally, the action must qualify under at least one of the three
subsections of FRCP 23(b). 20 A putative voter identification class
would qualify under FRCP 23(b)(2), which requires a finding that
"the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as
a whole."'"' Because district courts have broad discretion to
determine whether a proposed class meets these requirements, this
Article limits the hypothetical certification of a plaintiff class to the
jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit. 202
A. The Implied Threshold Requirement
in the Seventh Circuit: Definiteness
The Seventh Circuit holds that a class is sufficiently definite if
membership can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria. 203
Because the outcome of a class action suit binds all unnamed class
members, it is crucial to have a clear definition of which groups or
individuals are members of the class. 204 In cases where the class is
197. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a).
199. Wallace v. Chi. Hous. Auth. 224 F.R.D. 420, 425 (N.D. Il1. 2004).
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
202. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998).
203. Colbert v. Blagojevich, 2008 WL 4442597, slip copy at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
204. See JAMES WM. MOORE, 3B MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.40, at 98 (Supp. 1976-
77) ("The definition of the class represented is important, of course, when the defendant loses,
since it marks the boundaries of resjudicata."). See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565
F.2d 975, 978 n.6 (7th Cir. 1977).
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defined by an allegedly unconstitutional statute, regulation, policy, or
pattern, definiteness is generally met. "' In other words, regulations
provide the objective criteria by which definiteness can be
determined. 206 For example, the class of Medicaid-eligible plaintiffs
in Colbert v. Blagojevich 207 met the definiteness requirement because
state regulations served as the objective criteria by which the
plaintiffs could determine membership of the class. 20 The class in
that case was defined as "all Medicaid-eligible adults with
disabilities in Cook County, Illinois, who are being, or may in the
future be, unnecessarily confined to nursing facilities and with
appropriate supports and services may be able to live in a community
setting."2 °9  Similarly, Indiana's Voter ID Law creates objective
criteria for a putative voter identification class, and thus the threshold
requirement of definiteness is likely to be satisfied. 210 By contrast, a
class is determined to be indefinite where membership is contingent
on the state of mind of the prospective class members. 2 For
example, a class of Texas state residents who were active in the
"peace movement" and who might be chilled from First Amendment
expression was held to be too indefinite for certification. 212
Therefore, using the facts of Crawford, the putative class might
theoretically be defined as follows: citizens of the State of Indiana,
ages eighteen and older, who do not possess federal or Indiana state
photo identification required for in-person voting by Indiana's Voter
ID Law, and who are unable to obtain such identification because
they are (1) indigent, (2) disabled, (3) elderly, (4) out-of-state
students, (5) religious objectors, or (6) individuals who have changed
their legal name and only possess underlying identification stating
their previous name.213 This class definition should adequately
satisfy definiteness because it does not hinge on a state of mind but
205. Alliance to End Repression, 565 F.2d at 975.
206. Blagojevich, 2008 WL 4442597, slip copy at *3.
207. 2008 WL 4442597, slip copy at *3.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id.
211. Lau v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 245 F.R.D. 620, 624 (2007).
212. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (1970).
213. See IND. CODE. § 3-5-2-40.5 (2006); see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.,
128 S. Ct. 1610, 1629 (2008).
Spring 2009]
658 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 42:629
rather defines the class with respect to certain particular
characteristics in relation to a governmental regulation.
B. FRCP 23(a)(1): Numerosity
The first prerequisite of certification under FRCP 23(a) is
numerosity, which requires that the proposed class be "so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable." 24 The Seventh Circuit
has held that where the membership of the proposed class is at least
forty people, joinder is impracticable and the numerosity requirement
is sufficiently satisfied. 215
In a hypothetical plaintiff class, the forty-plaintiff rule is the
easiest bright-line method by which plaintiffs may establish
numerosity. A recent empirical examination of the first primary
election held after the enactment of Indiana's Voter ID law indicates
that the forty-plaintiff number is easily met. 216 The study found that
an estimated 2,770 provisional ballots were cast at the 2008 primary
election in Indiana. 217 Of that number, it is estimated that nearly 400
persons cast provisional ballots because they lacked photo
identification. 215 Of the provisional ballots cast, the vast majority
(80 percent of those ballots) were not counted. 29 More information
about these voters would be useful in precisely defining a putative
plaintiff class, but presently such detailed information is not
available in the public record. 220 Despite the limited information
about the voters, this survey indicates that the number of people
required for numerosity is likely to be met, despite the possibility of
214. FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(1).
215. See Swanson v. Am. Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1969).
216. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls
Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J.L. & POL., (forthcoming 2009).
217. Id. at 4.
218. Id. at 4-5.
219. Id.
220. Information about the voters, their provisional ballots, and the reasoning behind why
they were or were not counted has been difficult to find pursuant to an announcement from the
Indiana Public Access Counselor, who determined that all such information should be
confidential and unavailable as a public record. "From a practical standpoint, it is my opinion
[that] this means any information collected from the provisional ballot materials and used in the
free access system must be maintained as confidential." Letter from Heather Willis Neal, Public
Access Counselor, to J. Bradley King, Co-Dir., Ind. Election Div., 4 (Aug. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.ai.org/pac/index.htm (follow "Informal Inquiry 08-INF-28 Regarding provisional
ballot materials" hyperlink).
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considerable statistical error and deviation. 221 As long as the putative
plaintiff class presents some evidence in the form of a declaration or
affidavit establishing an approximate number of class members
reaching forty, numerosity should be satisfied. 222
C. FRCP 23(a)(2): Commonality
The commonality requirement mandates that "questions of law
or fact common to the class" must exist.223 Commonality serves two
purposes: (1) to promote the fair and adequate representation of the
interests of absentee class members, and (2) to ensure practical and
efficient case management. 224 In the Seventh Circuit, a common
nucleus of operative fact is sufficient to satisfy the commonality
requirements of FRCP 23(a)(2), 225 and such a common nucleus is
considered to be inherent in actions challenging government
221practices.
However, the putative voter identification class may not meet
the commonality requirement if the court ultimately has to make
separate inquiries into the facts surrounding the claims of each class
member. 227 The court failed to find commonality in Metcalf v.
Edelman, 228 where welfare recipients alleged that they could not
obtain housing compatible with their health and well-being under the
existing shelter system provided by the defendant state's welfare
officials. 229 The proposed class definition would have required the
court to make separate inquiries into the facts surrounding the claims
of the individual class members and determine whether or not each
potential class member was being deprived of a livelihood
compatible with each member's perception of his or her own health
and well-being. 230
221. See Pitts, supra note 216.
222. See FED.R.CIv.P. 23(c)(1).
223. FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(2)
224. MOORE, supra note 168, 23.23.
225. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992).
226. See United States v. Davis, 756 F. Supp. 1162, 1168-69 (E.D. Wis. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 961 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1992).
227. Klein v. Du Page County, 119 F.R.D 29, 31 (N.D. I11. 1988).
228. 64 F.R.D. 407 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
229. Id. at 408.
230. Id. at 409.
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In the voter identification context, a court may also be required
to make separate inquiries into each class member's circumstances to
determine whether he or she was unable to vote because of the severe
burdens imposed by the Voter ID Law. 23, As in Metalf 232 the
alleged harm to the putative plaintiff class in the voter identification
cases flows from an injury originated by a state regulation. But, the
precise problem in the voter identification context focuses on what
exactly constitutes a "burden" to the plaintiff. 233 The burden
imposed by the Voter ID Law takes various forms, such as indigency
and disability. 234 Even bus fare for a ride to the county clerk's office
to sign an affidavit may be burdensome for a homeless individual
who relies on welfare and charity for subsistence. 235
On the other hand, class certification on grounds of
commonality may be saved by the creation of subclasses. Under
FRCP 23(c)(5), a class may be divided into subclasses that are each
treated as a distinct class when appropriate. 236 The plaintiff generally
bears the burden of identifying and constructing such subclasses. 237
Thus, the putative class definition of a voter identification class may
be divided into subclasses of the indigent, the elderly, the disabled,
and other subcategories. Commonality may be found within
subclasses, and thus, certification may be saved.
However, there still remains some doubt as to whether
subclasses will achieve certification. The Supreme Court itself
appears ambivalent as to whether the burden upon voters is defined
by the type of burden or by the severity of the burden. 238 The
uncertainty of the results of this inquiry points to the possibility that
the court may not certify a plaintiff class on the basis of commonality
if a case-by-case inquiry proves to be more appropriate in
determining a plaintiff's burden.
231. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1625-26 (2008).
232. See Elemendorf& Foley, supra note 47, at 513.
233. Samuel P. Langholz, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93
IOWA L. REv. 731, 769 (2008).
234. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1632.
235. See Oddi, supra note 1.
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5).
237. U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980).
238. See supra Part II.D.
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D. FRCP 23(a)(3): Typicality
To meet the typicality requirement, the named plaintiffs claims
or defenses must be typical of the class but need not be identical. 239
A plaintiffs claim is typical if it "arises from the same event or
practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other
class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal
theory." 240 As long as a named representative with standing at the
time of certification meets the class definition, certification is not
likely to fail on this prong. 241 Factual distinctions between the
named plaintiffs claims and those of other class members do not
necessarily undermine typicality, 24 2 and because "commonality and
typicality are closely related, a finding of one often results in a
finding of the other." 243 Thus, a class representative who is severely
burdened by the Voter ID Law will be typical of a class of voters
who are also severely burdened by the same law. However, the
creation of subclasses may complicate a finding of typicality. 244 The
ethical issue presented by depriving one burdened individual of a
voter identification still remains for the pro bono attorney, but that
conflict may be resolved if the representative plaintiff chooses not to
obtain voter identification in order to embrace the goals of class
action litigation.
E. FRCP 23(a)(4): Adequacy of Representation
Rule 23(a)(4) is composed of two parts: (1) the adequacy of the
named plaintiffs counsel, and (2) the adequacy of the class
representative to protect the different, separate, and distinct interests
of the class members. 245 Provided that qualified and experienced pro
bono attorneys represent the proposed class, plaintiffs counsel will
most likely be found competent for the purposes of certification. 246
The purpose of probing the adequacy of the class representative is to
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998).
240. Keele, 149 F.3d at 595 (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225,
232 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
241. See 1 NEWBERG, supra note 42, § 2:28; see also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
242. De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232.
243. McKenzie v. City of Chi., 175 F.R.D. 280, 286 (N.D. I1. 1997).
244. See 1 NEWBERG, supra note 42, § 3:15. A detailed discussion on how typicality is
established with respect to subclasses is beyond the scope of this Article.
245. See id. § 3:1.
246. Id. § 3:21.
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avoid antagonism or conflicts of interest. 247 One case states
succinctly, "A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class
members have antagonistic or conflicting claims." 248 Again, there is
no reason to believe that the class representative would pose a
conflict of interest, unless the class representative was somehow
aligned with the state government or sympathetic to its interests.
Thus, adequacy of representation can be easily guarded by ensuring
the competency of class counsel and vigilance against conflicts of
interest by the class representative. 249
F. Injunctive or Declaratory Relief Under FRCP 23(b)(2)
FRCP 23(b)(2) provides that an action may be maintained as a
class action if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole .... ," 25" This rule is generally
invoked in cases where "injunctive or declaratory relief is the
primary or exclusive relief sought." 25 1 In cases challenging statutes
or government regulations, FRCP 23(b)(2) will probably be
considered the most appropriate option. Because a class action
against the Voter ID Law will most likely request injunctive relief,
FRCP 23(b)(2) probably applies. 252
Even though a class action as a procedural vehicle for an as-
applied challenge is a possibility for a putative Voter ID Law
plaintiff class, upon closer examination it is not certain that such a
class will be certified. Even if the plaintiff class defines itself to the
court's satisfaction, certification may fail on commonality if the
court finds that a case-by-case adjudication of the burdens imposed
by the Voter ID Law is necessary. This conclusion returns to the
hypothesis that an as-applied solution, even when utilizing a creative
procedural tool, is simply not a realistic option for voters severely
burdened by the Voter ID Law.
247. Id. § 3:22.
248. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992).
249. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13 (1982).
250. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
251. Buycks-Robertson v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
252. Telephone Interview with William R. Groth, supra note 142.
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VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHALLENGING A VOTER
IDENTIFICATION LAW
Aside from facial and as-applied challenges under the U.S.
Constitution, several alternative solutions to challenging a voter
identification law may be available. Challenges under state
constitutions, political solutions through local or congressional
amendments, and creative administrative relief and grassroots
activism by nonprofit organizations may also provide some alterative
solutions to plaintiffs burdened by a voter identification law.
A. Potential Relief Under a State Constitution
Bringing a facial challenge under a state constitution instead of
the U.S. Constitution is a legal alternative that may be pursued in
future challenges to voter identification laws. One such successful
challenge, Weinschenk v. Missouri, 253 was brought under Missouri's
equal protection clause 254 and under the guarantee of the right to vote
under Missouri's constitution.255 At issue in Weinschenk was a
Missouri statute mandating that in-person voters show
identification. 256 Like Indiana's Voter ID Law, the only permissible
forms of identification were a Missouri-issued license or federal
identification such as a U.S. passport.257 In evaluating the burden
upon the plaintiffs, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the
combination of the statistical evidence, the demonstrated expense
associated with obtaining identification, and the anecdotal evidence
from the elderly, the disabled, the indigent, and citizens who were
born out of state, was sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs were
actually and severely burdened by the law. 258 Moreover, the state
court considered nonmonetary obstacles, such as the time and ability
to navigate bureaucracies to obtain the necessary identification to
vote, to be especially difficult for the elderly and handicapped. 259
Further, the court found the state interest in preventing voter fraud
compelling but struck down the statute on its face because it was not
253. 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo. 2006).
254. MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 25; art. VIII, § 2.
255. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W. 3d 201, 205 (Mo. 2006).
256. Id. at 204.
257. Id. at 206.
258. See id. at 201.
259. Id. at 208-09.
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narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 260 Weinschenk's success in
invalidating a statute that was strikingly similar to the one upheld in
Crawford indicates that there is potential for future plaintiffs to
obtain relief in state courts, if not in federal court. 261
B. Political and Federal Solutions to Voter Identification Laws
As always, political solutions to restrictive voter identification
laws are available through traditional state or congressional
legislation. One of the reasons rancor and controversy have
surrounded Indiana's Voter ID Law is that the Republicans in
Indiana's General Assembly voted in favor of passing the Voter ID
Law and the Democrats opposed it. 262 In fact, the dissenting judge
on the Court of Appeals in Crawford expressed concern that
Indiana's Voter ID Law might have been fashioned to discourage
Democratic election-day turnout. 263 Thus, a political shift in
Indiana's General Assembly to a Democratic majority could give rise
to the revocation or amendment of the Voter ID Law. To wit,
Indiana politicians are already introducing legislation that would
change the requirements of Indiana's Voter ID Law. 264 In early
2009, Senator Susan Errington introduced a bill at the first regular
session of the 116th General Assembly expanding the types of
identification accepted at the polls on election day and making
affidavits to confirm identity available at the polls. 215  Although there
is no certainty that this bill or others like it will be adopted, its
introduction proves that politicians may continue to champion
changes to Indiana's Voter ID Law in future sessions.
260. Id. at 204-05.
261. Following Weinschenk's lead, the League of Women Voters subsequently challenged the
Indiana Voter ID Law under provisions of the Indiana State Constitution in 2008. See LWVIN
and Indiana Voter Law Litigation, http://www.lwvin.org/voterinfo/voterlDlawsuit.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009). In July 2008, the defendant, Secretary of State Rokita, filed a motion to
dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the defendant named was not the appropriate defendant.
Id. On December 17, Judge Reid granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. This dismissal
of the lawsuit was expected. Id. The League of Women Voters of Indianapolis will now file a
motion to appeal this ruling. Id.
262. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 n.21 (2008).
263. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F. 3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans,
J., dissenting).
264. S. 0005, 116th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008), available at http://www.in.go
v/legislative/senate democrats/homepages/s26/index.htm (follow "My Legislation" hyperlink;
then "SB 0005" hyperlink).
265. Id.
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A federal solution may also be possible through future
amendments or clarifications to existing statutes. For example,
HAVA 266  and NVRA,267  which already incorporate election
administration guidelines, could be amended to create uniform
identification requirements instead of merely creating a baseline for
compliance. Another plausible option is for Congress to approve
less problematic and cost-intensive forms of identification for voting
purposes. Present examples from other states include a utility bill, a
bank statement, a government check, military identification, or a
Medicare or Medicaid card. 268 Allowing additional forms of
identification gives voters a range of reasonable alternatives that
might be less burdensome to obtain. For example, accepting a
Medicare or Medicaid card as a form of in-person voter identification
may better accommodate elderly and indigent voters. Although not a
perfect solution, recognizing a diversity of identification may be one
way to accommodate a diversity of personal circumstances.
Lastly, opportunity for congressional action to reform voter
identification laws may be much more likely in the next few years
than ever before. Then-Senator Barack Obama and nineteen other
senators proposed a Senate resolution in 2005 against photo
identification laws, describing the state interest in preventing voter
fraud as one that was unsubstantiated and based on "exaggerated
fears." 269 Also, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the Senate Rules
and Administration Committee, which exercises jurisdiction over
proposed legislation for federal elections, filed an amicus brief in
favor of the plaintiffs in Crawford.27  The predominance of
vociferous and powerful objectors to voter identification laws in both
the Senate and the White House indicates that electoral reform
through legislation may occur during an opportune political
environment.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (Supp. II 2002).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2000).
268. National Conference of State Legislatures, Requirements for Voter Identification,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/voteridreq.htm#tablel (last updated Oct. 23,
2008).
269. S. Con. Res. 53, 109th Cong. (2005) available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
content/resource/senator-barack-obamas-senate-resolution-against-photo-id-requirements for_
v/.
270. Brief of United States Senator Dianne Feinstein et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-
25).
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C. Creative Administrative Suggestions
In lieu of actual changes to federal or state law, creative
solutions involving changes to state administration may also lessen
the burden imposed on voters. For example, making affidavit forms
more widely available may lessen travel costs for some voters with
limited mobility. Similarly, eliminating the costs of obtaining the
necessary underlying documentation may reduce the financial burden
on some voters, which would enable greater compliance with
Indiana's Voter ID Law.
1. Providing Provisional Ballots
at Multiple Locations
One creative administrative solution to lessen the burdens
imposed by the Voter ID Law is to make affidavits accompanying
provisional ballots more widely available. Affidavits could be made
available at the polls. This would eliminate an extra trip to a more
distant location for voters who are probably the least likely to be able
to make the trip. The fact that the homeless voter's affidavit in the
Grant County Council election was sent to the polls, signed on the
spot, and subsequently counted indicates that sending affidavits
directly to the polls is an administratively feasible alternative. 271 If
the state maintains that affidavits must be signed after election day,
other types of local government offices dispersed more evenly
throughout counties could be authorized to make affidavits available
in proportion to the number and dispersion of polling places. For
example, affidavits could be signed and turned in at a city clerk's
office or even at a local library branch. This would still preserve the
state interest while lessening the burden upon voters to travel in
order to obtain the affidavits.
2. Waiver of Fees for Underlying
Documentation
Another creative administrative solution that may lessen the
burden of the Voter ID Law is to waive fees for birth certificates or
other underlying documentation. Even though this solution would
only assist those voters born in Indiana, it would eliminate a serious
financial burden for many resident voters who were born in the state.
271. Oddi, supra note 1.
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Affidavit forms to confirm indigency similar to the ones required in
the provisional ballot work-around could be signed in lieu of fees,
thus enabling some indigent voters to obtain proper voter
identification in advance of election day. This solution will have the
additional salutary effect of eliminating the need to make indigent
voters travel to the county clerk's office during every election cycle.
Eliminating or even minimizing the fees for obtaining underlying
documentation will doubtless lessen many of the economic burdens
associated with voter identification laws. This is an incomplete
solution because some legitimate voters do not know where they
were born, but alleviating the burden on some voters may allow
others to define their burdens with more precision in future litigation.
D. Practical, Grassroots Efforts to Promote
Compliance with the Voter ID Law
Until political or administrative reform materializes, burdened
voters may take advantage of practical, grassroots efforts to assist
them in complying with the Voter ID Law. For example, Indiana has
initiated "BMV2You," a program to create a mobile license branch
that travels to communities and events across Indiana so that BMV
customers may conveniently access select BMV services. 272
Although BMV2You uses only one single vehicle that operates three
days a week and only travels to neighborhood-based locations such
as town squares and community events, it may be viewed as a
practical way to reduce the burden of traveling to a BMV. 273
However, the very existence of such a program may be evidence
of the state's tacit admission of the burdens imposed on voters who
cannot travel to a given BMV location. Considering that the annual
cost of maintaining the BMV2You program is likely tens of
thousands of dollars, these funds may be better utilized through a
more tailored solution for voters legitimately burdened by travel and
expense.
Additionally, educational programs by nonprofit groups like the
League of Women Voters ("LWV") continue to provide some relief
to voters who simply require guidance and direction to help them
272. See BMV2You Mobile License Branch, http://www.in.gov/bmv/3037.htm (last visited
February 12, 2009).
273. See id.
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comply with Indiana's Voter ID Law. 274 Although Justice Stevens's
opinion in Crawford suggested that transportation to the BMV to
obtain voter identification could be arranged "by a civic or political
group such as the League of Women Voters or a political party," 275
currently no such transportation programs exist. 276 Nonprofits may
opt to take up Justice Stevens's suggestion in the future, but as a
practical matter, such efforts are unlikely to be forthcoming due to
the scarcity of resources.277  Nonprofit organizations rely upon
volunteers for labor and donations for their financial support.
Moreover, there is a need to distribute their resources across multiple
programs that serve the public generally. 278 Voters cognizant of their
legal rights who affirmatively approach nonprofits may procure case-
by-case assistance with fees or transportation, but an extensive
transportation assistance program of the type suggested by Justice
Stevens is cost-prohibitive and beyond the purview of current
nonprofit programs. 279 In the meantime, nonprofit organizations,
like the League of Women Voters, continue admirable efforts to
promote education and awareness of Indiana's voter identification
requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although state constitutional challenges, political changes,
administrative alternatives, and traditional nonprofit assistance may
eventually alleviate the burden imposed by voter identification laws
like the one upheld in Crawford, the obstacles to bringing suit in
federal court are considerable. After Crawford, even the most
stringent voter identification laws must be challenged using the blunt
tool of an as-applied challenge. Practical limitations on resources
and remedies in an individual as-applied challenge are strong
deterrents to effective representation. Furthermore, it is unclear
whether a plaintiff class would be able to be certified in an as-applied
class action against a voter identification law. Some precedent
274. See League of Women Voters of Indiana, http://www.lwvin.org/voterinfo/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 13, 2009).
275. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 n.20 (2008).
276. Interview with Joanne Evers, supra note 141.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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indicates that a putative voter identification class may fail on
commonality grounds due to the necessity of a case-by-case
examination of the burdens imposed by the voter identification law.
Thus, the reference in Crawford to a future as-applied solution is
illusory. The invocation of an as-applied challenge as an adequate
safeguard to protecting the right to vote in unconstitutional
applications is an attractive idea on its face. But upon closer
examination, it is a hollow promise, a legal chimera. Under current
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the best option to vindicate the rights
of voters disenfranchised by voter identification laws may be to
pursue an alternative political or administrative solution and
acquiesce to the existence of voter identification laws. For now, the
limited resources of advocates may be best utilized by simply
helping burdened voters to comply with voter identification laws.
Nevertheless, alternative solutions keep the hope alive that in the
long run, challengers to the law may still win the war even if they
decline to wage a futile battle.
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